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Comparing Three Ways to Update Choquet
Beliefs
Abstract
We analyze three rules that have been proposed for updating capacities. First we consider their
implications for updating the Choquet Expected Utility of a binary bet. Only the Generalized
Bayesian Updating rule updates both the decision weight on the good outcome and the decision
weight on the bad outcome in a symmetric manner analogous to the way the expected utility of
a binary bet is updated. Second we show that for neo-additive capacities, a class of capacities
that allows for both optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty, only the Generalized
Bayesian Updating rule retains the same degree of relative optimism for the updated capacity as
was present in the unconditional capacity. For the updates of the other two, either the individual
is fully optimistic or fully pessimistic.
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1 SEU and CEU
This paper studies how beliefs can be updated to take account of new information in the
context of ambiguity. In subjective expected utility theory (henceforth SEU), choice under
uncertainty is perceived as the maximization of the mathematical expectation of the utility
function with respect to the subjective probabilities. More precisely, let S denote the set of
states and E the set of events (which for our purposes we shall take to be the set of subsets
of S). A simple act is defined to be a function from S to X with finite range, where X
denotes the set of outcomes. Let F denote that set of all simple acts. Then for any SEU
maximizer there exists a utility index u : X → R and a probability measure π on E , such
that her preferences % over F , can be represented by the following functional:
U (f) =
X
u
π ({s ∈ S : u (f (s)) = u})× u. (1)
Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU) is the extension of SEU in which the math-
ematical (Choquet) expectation of the utility function is taken with respect to a capacity
rather than a probability. A capacity is any function defined on E , that is normalized
(ν (∅) = 0 and ν (S) = 1) and respects set monotonicity (for all E,F in E , E ⊂ F ⇒
ν (E) ≤ ν (F )).1 Formally, along with the utility index u (·) there is a capacity ν (·), such
that preferences % over F , can be represented by the Choquet integral:
V (f) =
Z
u (f (s)) dν (s) =
X
u
[ν ({s ∈ S : u (f (s)) ≥ u})− ν ({s ∈ S : u (f (s)) > u})]×u.
(2)
To see the connection with SEU, notice that (1) can be equivalently expressed as:
U (f) =
X
u
[π ({s ∈ S : u (f (s)) ≥ u})− π ({s ∈ S : u (f (s)) > u})]× u. (3)
Hence, (2) collapses to (1) whenever ν (·) is additive, that is, ν (E ∩ F ) + ν (E ∪ F ) = ν (E)
+ ν (F ), for all E,F in E .
1 For axiomatizations of CEU see Gilboa (1989), Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin & Wakker (1992)
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2 Updating SEU
One of the many advantages of SEU is that there is a well-established theory of how pref-
erences should be updated conditional on the knowledge that the state lies in a particular
event E ⊂ S. The relationship between the representation of the unconditional preferences
and the conditional, can be obtained by updating π (·) using the law of conditional probabil-
ity. More precisely, if % over F can be represented by a functional of the form given in (1)
then for any event E in E , such that π (E) > 0, the conditional preferences admit an SEU
representation, with the same utility index u (·), and a subjective probability πE (·), given
by,
πE (A) =
π (A ∩E)
π (E)
for all A in E . (4)
3 Three Ways to Update Capacities
The situation for CEU is not so well settled. There have been a number of proposals and
axiomatizations to characterize the updating of CEU preferences. The three we consider
here, all share the feature of SEU that the utility index appearing in the representation of
the updated preferences is unchanged. Furthermore, also analogous to updated SEU, it is
only the capacity representing the beliefs that is adjusted in response to the information
that the state resides in the event E. The three rules are: the optimistic updating rule
(see Gilboa & Schmeidler [1993]), the Dempster-Shafer rule (see Dempster [1968] and Shafer
[1976]), and the Generalized Bayesian Updating rule (see Dempster [1967], Fagin & Halpern
[1991], Walley [1991] and Jaﬀray [1992]).2 The formal definitions follow.
For any event E in E , let Ec denote the complement of E.
2 For the behavioral foundations of the optimistic and Dempster-Shafe updating rules see Gilboa &
Schmeidler (1993), and for the Generalized Bayesian updating rule see Eichberger et al (2007) and Horie
(2007a). Horie (2007b) characterizes a general updating rule for convex capacities that includes all three
rules as special cases. She refers to the Generalized Bayesian updating rule as the Dempster-Fagin-Halpern
(DFH) rule. The term Generalized Bayesian updating rule is due to Walley (1991).
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Definition 1 The optimistic updating rule is given by
νOE (A) =
ν (A ∩E)
ν (E)
. (5)
Definition 2 The Dempster-Shafer updating rule is given by
νDSE (A) =
ν (A ∪Ec)− ν (Ec)
1− ν (Ec) . (6)
Definition 3 The Generalized Bayesian updating rule is given by
νGBE (A) =
ν (A ∩E)
ν (A ∩E) + 1− ν (A ∪Ec) . (7)
It is straightforward to check that all three reduce to (4) if the original capacity ν is
additive. For (5) it is immediate. For (6), notice that additivity implies that ν (A ∪Ec)−
ν (Ec) = ν (A ∩E), and 1 − ν (Ec) = ν (E). For (7), additivity implies 1 − ν (A ∪Ec)
= ν (Ac ∩E), and applying additivity again yields ν (A ∩E) + ν (Ac ∩E) = ν (E).
To compare and contrast these updating rules, consider the Choquet Expected Utility of
a binary bet, or an act of the form ‘a bet for x on A and (equivalently) a bet against y on
Ac’ and that we shall denote by xAy (where x and y are both in X, with x Â y):
V (xAy) = ν (A)u (x) + [1− ν (A)]u (y) . (8)
For a given capacity μ, let μ¯ (·) denote the conjugate capacity to μ (·), where for each B
in E , μ¯ (B) := 1−μ (Bc).3 With this definition in hand, we see that (8) can be re-expressed
as follows:
V (xAy) = ν (A)u (x) + ν¯ (Ac)u (y) . (9)
From (9) we see that for a simple bet, the decision weight on the favorable event (that is,
event A) is given by the capacity of that event, while the decision weight on the unfavorable
event (that is, the complement of A) is given by the conjugate capacity of that event.
3 Notice that any probability measure π (that is, is an additive capacity) is self-conjugate: π¯ (E) =
1− π (Ec) = π (E) for all E in E.
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Now let us consider the conditional CEU of a simple bet and how it varies depending on
which rule is used to generate the updated capacity (and hence updated conjugate capacity).
If νE (·) denotes the updated capacity conditional on the event E having obtained (and
so ν¯E (B) = 1 − νE (Bc) is the associated updated conjugate capacity), then the updated
CEU of that bet conditional on E having obtained is given by:
VE (xAy) = νE (A)u (x) + ν¯E (Ac) u (y) . (10)
Applying the Optimistic Updating Rule in (5) to the right-hand side of (10), we obtain:
V OE (xAy) =
ν (A ∩E)
ν (E)
u (x) +
ν (E)− ν (A ∩E)
ν (E)
u (y) . (11)
Applying the Dempster-Shafer Updating Rule in (6) to the right-hand side of (10) yields:
1− ν (Ec)− (1− ν (A ∪Ec))
1− ν (Ec) u (x) +
1− ν (A ∪Ec)
1− ν (Ec) u (y) .
Hence we have,
V DSE (xAy) =
[ν¯ (E)− ν¯ (Ac ∩E)]
ν¯ (E)
u (x) +
ν¯ (Ac ∩E)
ν¯ (E)
u (y) . (12)
Applying the Generalized Bayesian Updating Rule in (7) to the right-hand side of (10) yields:
ν (A ∩E)
ν (A ∩E) + 1− ν (A ∪Ec)u (x) +
1− ν (A ∪Ec)
ν (A ∩E) + 1− ν (A ∪Ec)u (y) ,
or
V GBE (xAy) =
ν (A ∩E)
ν (A ∩E) + ν¯ (Ac ∩E)u (x) +
ν¯ (Ac ∩E)
ν (A ∩ E) + ν¯ (Ac ∩E)u (y) . (13)
The Optimistic Updating Rule adjusts the decision weight on the good outcome ac-
cording to the law of conditional probability, with the decision weight on the bad outcome
determined as the complementary decision weight. The Dempster-Shafer Rule adjusts the
decision weight on the bad outcome according to the law of conditional probability with
the decision weight on the good outcome determined as the complementary decision weight.
The Generalized Bayesian Updating rule, on the other hand adjusts both the capacity de-
termining the decision weight on the good outcome and the conjugate capacity determining
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the weight on the bad outcome in a ‘balanced’ or ‘symmetric’ manner which mirrors the
Bayesian updating rule for receipt of information. To illustrate this connection, recall that
a probability measure (that is, additive capacity) is self-conjugate (that is, π (B) = π¯ (B),
for all B in E). This allows us to express the updated expected utility of a simple bet xAy
conditional on the event E obtaining, in the following manner:
UBE (xAy) =
π (A ∩E)
π (A ∩E) + π¯ (Ac ∩E)u (x) +
π¯ (Ac ∩E)
π (A ∩ E) + π¯ (Ac ∩E)u (y) . (14)
4 Updating Neo-additive Capacities
Perhaps a more compelling argument in favor of the Generalized Bayesian Updating rule
can be seen when the capacity that is to be updated exhibits both optimistic and pessimistic
attitudes toward uncertainty. A particularly simple and parsimoniously parameterized ca-
pacity that exhibits such behavior is the neo-additive capacity introduced by Chateauneuf,
Grant and Eichberger (2007).
Neo-additive capacities may be viewed as a convex combination of an additive capac-
ity and a special capacity that only distinguishes between whether an event is impossible,
possible or certain. To eschew a more detailed discussion about which events are deemed
impossible, possible or certain by the individual, we shall restrict our focus to the case where
the only null event is the empty set and the only event which is certain is the state space
itself or the conditioning event in the case of conditional capacities.
Formally, we define a conditional neo-additive preference relation as follows:
Definition 4 (Neo-additive Preferences) Fix an event E ⊆ S. The capacity νE is a
conditional neo-additive capacity, if there exists an additive probability πE with support E
such that:
νE (A) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if A ∩ E = ∅,
δEαE + (1− δE)πE (A) if A ∩ E /∈ {∅, E},
1 if E ⊆ A,
where δE, αE ∈ [0, 1]. The relation %E is a conditional neo-additive preference relation,
if there exists a continuous non-constant real-valued function u on X, and a conditional
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neo-additive capacity νE on E such that for all f, g ∈ F
f %E g ⇐⇒
Z
u (f (s)) dνE (s) >
Z
u (g (s)) dνE (s) .
Hence a conditional neo-additive capacity νE is characterized by the tuple hπE, δ, αi. The
weight (1− δE) on the probability measure πE may be interpreted as the decision maker’s
degree of confidence in his “additive beliefs”. The remaining weight δE may in turn be viewed
as the lack of confidence in these beliefs, and depending on the relative degree of optimism
(i.e. αE) a fraction of that “residual” weight is assigned to the best outcome that can obtain
in E with the remainder assigned to the worst outcome that can obtain in E.
Straightforward calculation reveals that the Choquet integral of the simple function u◦f
with respect to a neo-additive capacity νE is equal to:
(1− δ) EπE [u ◦ f ] + δE
µ
αE ·max
s∈E
{u (f (s))}+ (1− αE) ·min
s∈E
{u (f (s))}
¶
.
The following result shows that the update of a neo-additive capacity under any of these
three rules is itself neo-additive. However it is only the Generalized Bayesian Updating
rule which leaves optimism unchanged and just updates beliefs and perceived ambiguity. In
contrast for the Dempster-Shafer (resp. Optimistic) rule the updated preferences are always
ambiguity-averse (resp. ambiguity-loving). Hence with either of these rules, the degree of
optimism of the updated capacity diﬀers dramatically from that of the original capacity.
Proposition 1 Fix a conditioning event E ⊆ S, an unconditional neo-additive capac-
ity, ν, characterized by the parameters hπ, δ, αi . Assume π (E) > 0. Then for all three
updating rules the updated capacity, νE, is also neo-additive with parameters hπE, δE, αEi.
In all cases the updated additive probability πE is the Bayesian update of π,
πE (A) =
π (A ∩ E)
π (E)
, for each A ∈ E,
otherwise πE is arbitrary. The capacity νE satisfies:
1. for the optimistic updating rule, αOE,α = 1, δ
O
E,α =
δα
(1−δ)π(E)+δα ,
νOE (A) =
¡
1− δOE,α
¢
πE (A) + δOE,α, if ∅ $ A ∩ E $ E;
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2. for the pessimistic updating rule, αDSE,α = 0, δ
DS
E,α =
δ(1−α)
(1−δ)π(E)+δ(1−α) ,
νDSE (A) =
¡
1− δDSE,α
¢
πE (A) , if ∅ $ A ∩E $ E;
3. for the Generalized Bayesian updating rule, αGBE,α = α, δ
GB
E,α =
δ
(1−δ)π(E)+δ ,
νGBE,α (A) = δ
GB
E,αα+
¡
1− δGBE,α
¢
πE (A) , if ∅ $ A ∩E $ E;
where δOE,α and αOE,α denote the ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude parameters for the
optimistic update of ν, etc..
Proof. From the definition of a neo-additive capacity, we have for any E ∈ E , νE (∅) = 0
and νE (E) = 1. Fix an event A, such that A ∩ E /∈ {∅, E}. Applying the expressions (5),
(6) and (7) from the definition of the three updating rules we have
νOE (A) =
ν (A ∩E)
ν (E)
=
(1− δ)π (A ∩E) + δα
(1− δ)π (E) + δα (15)
=
(1− δ)π (E)
(1− δ)π (E) + δα ×
π (A ∩E)
π (E)
+
δα
(1− δ)π (E) + δα ;
νDSE (A) =
ν (A ∪Ec)− ν (Ec)
1− ν (Ec)
=
(1− δ)π (A ∩ E)
(1− δ)π (E) + δ (1− α) (16)
=
(1− δ)π (E)
(1− δ)π (E) + δ (1− α) ×
π (A ∩E)
π (E)
;
νGBE (A) =
ν (A ∩E)
1− ν (Ec ∪A) + ν (A ∩E)
=
(1− δ)π (A ∩E) + δα
1− [(1− δ)π (Ec ∪A) + δα] + (1− δ)π (A ∩ E) + δα
=
(1− δ)π (A ∩E) + δα
(1− δ)π (E) + δ (17)
=
(1− δ)π (E)
(1− δ)π (E) + δ ×
π (A ∩E)
π (E)
+
δ
(1− δ)π (E) + δ × α
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Remark 1 A similar result applies when π (E) = 0. Fix an event A, such that A ∩ E /∈
{∅, E}. Notice that the definitions of updated capacities are still well-defined provided α > 0
and δ > 0. From (15) we obtain, νOE (A) = 1, from (16) we obtain, ν
DS
E (A) = 0, and from
(17) we obtain, νGBE (A) = α.
What we find particularly appealing about the Generalized Bayesian update of the neo-
additive capacity is that for the conditional preference relation %E, the relative degree of
optimism parameter α is the same as it was for the unconditional preference relation. The
individual’s degree of optimism versus pessimism as embodied in the parameter α is unaf-
fected by conditioning on an event, just as her “risk-attitudes” as embodied in the utility
index u remain the same. Her “lack of confidence” parameter δE, however, does change
and the change is related to the ex ante probability π (E) of the conditioning event E. The
less likely it was for the conditioning event to arise under her “additive belief” π, the less
confidence the individual attaches to the additive component of the updated neo-additive
capacity.
Compare this to the updated capacities obtained by applying the Optimistic updating
rule and the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. With both of these rules, the degree of optimism
of the updated capacity diﬀers dramatically from the degree of optimism of the original
unconditional capacity. No matter what event E ⊂ S we condition upon, with the Optimistic
updating rule, αOE = 1, and with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule, α
DS
E = 0. Thus
updating changes ambiguity-attitude.
References
Chateauneuf, A., Eichberger, J. and S. Grant (2007): “Choice under uncertainty with
the best and worst in Mind: Neo-additive capacities,” Journal of Economic Theory,
137, 538 - 567.
Dempster, A.P. (1967): “Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued
Mapping,” Annals of Mathematical Statistics 38, 205-247.
Dempster, A. P.(1968): “A Generalization of Bayesian Inference,” Journal of Royal
Statisitical Society Series B 30, 205-247.
8
Eichberger, J., S. Grant and D. Kelsey (2007): “Updating Choquet Beliefs,” Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 43, 888-899.
Fagin, R. and J.Y. Halpern (1991): “A New Approach to Updating Beliefs,” in P.P.
Bonissone, M. Henrion, L.N. Kanal and J.F. Lemmer, eds, Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence 6, 347-374.
Gilboa, I. (1987): “Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16(1), 65-88.
Horie, M. (2007a): “Reexamination on Updating Choquet Beliefs,” Kyoto Institute of
Economic Research Discussion Paper no. 643.
Horie, M. (2007b): “A General Update Rule for Convex Capacities,” Kyoto Institute
of Economic Research Discussion Paper no. 644.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1993): “Updating Ambiguous Beliefs,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 59, 33-49.
Jaﬀray, J.-Y. (1992): “Bayesian Updating and Belief Functions.” IEEE Transactions
on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 22, 1144-1152.
Sarin, R. and P. Wakker (1993): “A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected
Utility,” Econometrica 60, 1255-1272.
Schmeidler, D. (1989): “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additiv-
ity,” Econometrica 57, 571-587.
Shafer, G. (1976): A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University Press,
Princeton New Jersey.
Walley, P. (1991): Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. Chapman and
Hall, London.
9
